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The FSA, “credible deterrence”, and criminal enforcement – a 
“haphazard pursuit”? 
 
1. Introduction 
 
[...] [w]e intend to be bolder and more resolute about proceeding with market abuse and insider 
dealing cases so that we can actually bring about a change in the culture of the City [...] (Cole, 
2008).  
 
It is not for us to say whether any particular agency, along with the offences created to support 
its regulatory activities, are unnecessary. However, it is important to point out that the offences 
created to support the activities of regulatory agencies are often rarely used [...] (Law 
Commission, 2010, para. 1.25). 
 
It is widely acknowledged that the aftermath of the global financial crisis – termed by 
former Prime Minister Gordon Brown in 2010 as the “first crisis of globalisation” (Brown, 
2010) – is set to put in place a new regulatory landscape[1]. In furtherance of this, new 
“regulatory conversations” are occurring both at national level within many individual 
nation states – both within the much troubled Eurozone and outwith; and also beyond this 
on Pan-European and international platforms. Much of this “spotlight” is on banking 
specifically within financial sector activity. This is so on account of continuing concerns 
about regulating so-called systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs)[2] – where 
ongoing anxiety is being tracked by a number of exposures of impropriety[3]. More 
generally, and for a long time into the future, the crisis is likely to be associated with its 
systematic exposure of “unethical” behaviour (O’Brien, 2012, pp. 178-179). Widely 
perceived as the failure of light-touch regulation and risk assessment (Tomasic, 2011, p. 
7)[4], for some the financial crisis is also likely to mark a turning point for responding to 
“financial crime” (Tomasic, 2011, p. 7). This is so on account of exposure of conduct 
occurring during the crisis which is being regarded as potentially criminal behaviour, and 
which will ensure that the crisis is also likely to carry longstanding associations with the 
revelation of “massive financial fraud” (Tomasic, 2011, p. 7). The latter suggestion forms 
a central plank for the hypothesis of the “haphazard pursuit of financial crime” (Tomasic, 
2011, p. 7). 
 
This paper explores some domestic dimensions of the hypothesis of the “haphazard 
pursuit of financial crime”. This was proposed by Tomasic (2011, p. 8) as a lament on the 
lack of development of “criminal sanctions applicable to corporate financial misconduct”, 
and the concomitant under-utilisation of such sanctions in the context of financial failure. 
For this paper this construct has been appropriated to consider the pursuit of financial 
crime by the UK regulator put in place in 2000, the Financial Services Authority 
(hereafter referenced as the FSA, or the Authority). In acknowledging that the financial 
crisis has already revealed a considerable amount of financial crime (Tomasic, 2011, pp. 
7-8), and that such exposures are likely to continue for a time yet, it considers the 
hypothesis of “haphazard pursuit of financial crime” as one for exploring more generally 
criminal enforcement work carried out by the Authority. The FSA is of course being 
disbanded on account of changes introduced in the Financial Services Act 2012, and its 
replacement with the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is imminent on account of the 
“twin peaks” regime introduced by the 2012 Act[5]. The article is in any case most 
interested in the FSA’s financial crime enforcement activities, flowing from its statutory 
remit as the body which until the financial crisis enjoyed jurisdiction over “virtually 
everything financial in the UK” (Omoyele, 2006, p. 194). This requires paying attention 
to FSA enforcement beyond its responses to activity directly and indeed causally related 
to the crisis. In taking these more specific and also more generalised perspectives on the 
crisis together, the article seeks to cast light on the scope of the challenges being faced by 
the incoming FCA in respect of criminal enforcement in the post-financial crisis 
regulatory environment. 
 
 Centrally the article explores key dimensions of the FSA’s functions as a criminal 
prosecutor, and key characteristics of its policy formation relating to this, and its 
experiences as such. In taking a lead from outgoing Chief Executive Hector Sants’ 
explanations of the scope of the FSA’s criminal prosecutorial functions, the role   actually 
played by the FSA in relation to financial crime needs to be discerned from what is 
actually possible to bring within the rubric of financial crime. From the types of financial 
crime potentially of interest for the FSA, the article looks specifically at financial market 
misconduct offences. This means that this application of Tomasic’s hypothesis is much 
narrower than Tomasic’s (2011, p. 8) own association of financial crime with “criminal 
sanctions applicable to corporate financial misconduct”. Here it is suggested that 
analysing the FSA’s approach to offences commonly found grouped under the rubric of 
“market abuse” through the lens of the “haphazard pursuit of financial crime” is an 
extremely valuable way of understanding a number of key themes which are apparent in 
Tomasic’s reflections on the under-utilisation of criminal enforcement. These include 
centrally the nature and function of regulators, and the “external” forces which influence 
their policies and actions, and especially the pressure to be effectual and yet not “heavy 
[handed] and intrusive” (Tomasic, 2011, p. 8). This also embraces the nature and 
significance of criminal enforcement within English legal culture, and the intellectual and 
pragmatic difficulties its direction towards financial crime has traditionally encountered. 
Many of these considerations are to be found captured in Tomasic’s proposition that 
“White collar [...] crimes have long been part of markets and are among the most difficult 
crimes for the legal system to deal with, let alone control” (Tomasic, 2011, p. 7). 
 
Straddling these key considerations, this discussion considers the significance that has 
been attached by the FSA to criminal enforcement as part of its key ethos and philosophy 
of “credible deterrence”. These are interesting issues and ones that are worthwhile 
exploring in the light of long-standing concerns about the pursuit of responding to 
financial crime emanating from scholars and practitioners alike, and ones which – as will 
be explained – are very much to the fore as part of the regulatory aftermath of the global 
financial crisis. There are three further considerations discussed in this article which are 
likely to influence responses to financial crime at this crucial juncture for future regulation 
of UK financial markets. The first is that, as previously noted, the FSA itself is due to be 
disbanded and its functions separated into two different regulatory bodies, with the 
aforementioned FCA (rather than the PRA[6]) set to undertake FSA functions relating to 
financial crime[7]. From this there are important questions concerning how the attention 
which is currently being paid to financial crime by the FSA could forecast how the FCA 
approach might be fashioned from its proposed remit. Very generally, key policy 
literature is giving some signpostings of the FCA’s envisioned functions and approach, 
and from this, this discussion considers the challenges which might by faced by the FCA. 
This includes reference to the considerable pressure currently being placed on 
government departments to move away from utilising criminal enforcement. 
 
This particular development is explored using the Law Commission’s (2010). A number 
of key recommendations have already been implemented in the Criminal Offences 
Gateway Guidance published by Ministry of Justice (2011), and attention is paid to the 
possible significance of this exercise for FCA enforcement. Whilst FSA criminal 
enforcement of market abuse would not be regarded by the Law Commission (2010, para. 
1.15) as the use of “low level criminal penalties” for “minor offences”, from its key 
recommendation that government departments should generally place greater emphasis 
on civil penalties which are as effective, there are potentially some implications for the 
pursuit of financial crime within English legal culture. From this, the need to consider 
some of the key parameters of the Law Commission exercise is  especially evident on 
account of a third factor: new pronouncements on the value of criminal enforcement from 
Europe, especially in relation to market abuse. 
 
2. The “haphazard pursuit of financial crime”: the financial crisis, and criminal 
enforcement beyond the crisis 
 
The exposures which will be responsible for the associations of the global financial crisis 
with “massive financial fraud” actually started to happen as early as 2008, in the USA, in 
the case of investment giant Bear Sterns. At this time it was suggested that the prosecution 
of two key executives for their role in the securitization of sub-prime mortgage assets was 
destined, as far as (in that instance, the USA) authorities were concerned, to become a 
test for the “[...] ability to make successful prosecutions of highly complex financial 
transactions” (Thomas, 2008). In the event, in the USA the Bear Sterns criminal trial did 
collapse, and enforcement credibility was also tainted by the controversial settlement of 
the civil suit for fraud against Goldman Sachs for its conduct relating to sub-prime 
mortgage securities. In the UK at one point it looked possible that criminal charges might 
be brought in respect of investment activity being conducted by Lehman Bros prior to its 
collapse, on account of revelation that the firm was able to conceal $50 bn of debts from 
regulators despite auditing checks. A report ordered by the court overseeing bankruptcy 
proceedings submitted that Lehman’s top management and auditor Ernst & Young used 
“accounting gimmicks” to hide troubled assets whilst also criticising “magic circle” law 
firm Linklaters for “signing off” on what was happening (Inman, 2010). Notwithstanding 
this powerful criticism that “[t]oo much is being concealed” and insistence that what is 
needed is a “fresh approach that gives a more realistic picture of bank finances and not 
one that disguises risky practices” (Inman, 2010), criminal charges arising from 
misconduct during the crisis remain elusive, save from the conviction of UBS trader 
Kweku Adoboli in November 2012. Equally, the fines imposed during late 2012 on 
Barclays and UBS for their misconduct in respect of Libor, and the HSBC settlement 
relating to money laundering activities undertaken by the institution do not appear to have 
influenced a movement towards criminal enforcement, notwithstanding rhetoric 
generated by these exposures suggesting differently. Indeed, once again, attempts to 
engage at all in criminal enforcement can be seen in the USA rather than the UK, as 
evident from ongoing Department of Justice criminal investigations of numerous 
Barclays senior executives linked to the UK and US regulatory investigations into 
Libor[8]. 
 
Such occurrences alone could provide persuasive prima facie support for the proposition 
of “haphazard pursuit of financial crime” characterising UK enforcement. Furthermore, 
such a narrative appears to be strongly supported by perceptions in some quarters that 
financial sector activity is “fundamentally [...] criminogenic” (Friedrichs, 2012, p. 6). 
Friedrichs’ (2011) suggestion that the culture and collective practices of the financial 
system that spawned the crisis promoted “harmful conduct that either is in violation of 
the criminal law or ought to be” is a powerful one, and one which enjoys a lengthy 
tradition within criminology (Sutherland, 1940, 1945, 1949). But there is also a 
substantial body of evidence suggesting that this castigation of conduct within high 
finance, and actually financial sector activity more broadly, does already underpin and 
inform much FSA thinking on responding to financial market misconduct, and that it did 
so for some considerable time predating the crisis. It also appears to be a central   tenet of 
the Authority’s own regard for importance of criminal enforcement in improving market 
behaviour in order to fulfil its statutory objectives[9]. Here, it is very significant that the 
FSA has experienced perceptions of poor track-record for prosecuting market misconduct, 
notwithstanding its longstanding and demonstrable cultural commitment to using 
criminal enforcement in the pursuit of its philosophy of “credible deterrence”. From 
examining the significance of “credible deterrence” for the Authority it becomes clear 
that it cuts across the Authority’s enforcement machinery, and spans the Authority’s 
activity in imposing financial penalties, cancelling firms’ permissions, and subjecting 
individuals to prohibitions. Equally, there has been a notable increased focus on criminal 
enforcement for financial crime specifically from c. 2005 onwards. Moreover, this was 
for the FSA both conscious and something it has been keen to publicise. At the heart of 
this lies understanding what is meant by “credible deterrence”, and considering how this 
is connected with FSA use of criminal enforcement in response to financial crime. It also 
requires appreciating why the middle years of the decade to 2010 became such a 
significant reference point for this strategy. 
 
FSA enforcement practice and culture: identifying “credible deterrence” and locating 
the regulator’s pursuit of financial crime 
 
As suggested above, “credible deterrence” is a reference point for much of the Authority’s 
work in fulfilling its statutory functions as the UK financial services regulator. The 
Authority’s Business Plan for 2012-2013 references the continuing pursuit of “credible 
deterrence” as one of its priorities for this timeframe (FSA, 2012-2013, pp. 47, 52). This 
document identifies it as the regulator’s key enforcement philosophy which supports 
fulfilment of its statutory objectives, and also informs the delivery of commitments made 
using its resources effectively and efficiently (FSA, 2012-2013, p. 63)[10]. Its status as a 
conscious philosophy or ethos of the Authority is thus clear, and its continuing 
significance as the enforcement functions of the FSA become those of the FCA is evident 
from a number of speeches from incoming head Martin Wheatley. Wheatley (2012a) 
suggested that the FCA would build on the direction taken by the FSA in recent years, 
but the new body’s remit would also require FCA staff to embrace a “new set of values 
in their work and thinking” required to protect consumers, promote competition and 
ensure market integrity. However, this was couched in the CEO Designate’s simultaneous 
insistence that building on the FSA’s direction would involve retaining “our policy of 
credible deterrence, pursuing enforcement cases to punish wrongdoing” (Wheatley, 
2012a). 
 
In the context of financial crime specifically, the continuing significance of “credible 
deterrence” can be seen deeply embedded in the speeches of current head of Enforcement 
and Financial Crime Tracey McDermott, as it can in those of her predecessor Margaret 
Cole. Much more is said about the Margaret Cole era shortly, but in terms of marking 
future directions, in July 2012 Ms McDermott insisted that credible deterrence was “here 
to stay” (McDermott, 2012b). In explaining that enforcement was not the only tool within 
the regulatory framework, she insisted equally that it was a central part of the regulator’s 
public profile, playing a vital role in seeking to change behaviour by establishing that 
there are “real and meaningful consequences for those [...] who do not play by the rules” 
(McDermott, 2012b). 
 
In making this statement on the importance of enforcement within the regulatory regime, 
Ms McDermott identified firms and individuals as being subject to it. In turn, this helps 
to clarify that the activities of the regulator – the current FSA and the  incoming FCA – 
are cast from its remit of meeting its statutory objectives. Originally located within s. 2 
of the FSMA 2000, these objectives were significantly altered as part of a suite of reforms 
to the Authority’s functions courtesy of the Financial Services Act 2010[11], and once 
again by provisions of the Financial Services Act 2012. The 2012 Act now references the 
FCA’s objectives as ones connected with consumer protection, competition, and integrity. 
Historically, responses to market abuse have had strongest nexus with the regulatory 
objective of “reduction of financial crime”. In contrast, the need to absent activity termed 
as market abuse can now be found within the “integrity” objective under the new s.61D 
Financial Services Act 2012, located alongside the importance of financial markets being 
orderly and transparent. This is in a manner which now separates “market abuse” from 
“financial crime” more generally, and thereby changes their historical association. 
 
In terms of understanding the historical associations between “credible deterrence”, 
financial crime and market abuse, more now must be said about how the Authority has 
regarded “credible deterrence” as an approach to regulation across the scope of its 
enforcement activities beyond market abuse. This can be seen in the reference made to it 
as underpinning the Authority’s approach to breaches of transaction reporting 
requirements in FSAs (2012-2013, p. 38)[12]. The Business Plan does not actually define 
“credible deterrence” but its meaning can be discerned contextually from several 
references within it, and from other key FSA publications. Thus, in terms of ascertaining 
its significance, as Sants (2009) explained, it was formally adopted as a philosophy by 
the Authority in 2008 in its quest to promote confidence in high levels of “market quality” 
within UK financial markets. From the FSA documentation the pervasive influence of 
“credible deterrence” for the FSA is manifest, but the article will utilise it more narrowly. 
Indeed, the article’s interest in using it as a mechanism for exploring the hypothesis of 
“haphazard pursuit of financial crime” in Britain requires explaining how “credible 
deterrence” can be seen manifested specifically in the regulator’s criminal enforcement 
activity. This requires understanding of the types of financial crime that the FSA does 
actually pursue. It also requires determining what is actually meant by the philosophy of 
“credible deterrence”, in terms of how it seeks to achieve market quality, as now 
manifested in s. 61D of the 2012 Act. These key considerations can be ascertained from 
examining numerous FSA documents, and ones which relate to the incoming FCA. 
 
Identifying and illuminating “credible deterrence” – discerning FSA/FCA philosophy 
 
References to “credible deterrence” in FSAs (2012-2013) are many and manifold, and 
explain that the pursuit of “credible deterrence” involves “robustly deploying our civil 
and criminal prosecution” which is an approach which “will be taken forward by [...] 
subsequently the FCA” (FSA, 2012-2013, p. 8). This document also references the 
Authority’s “credible deterrence” agenda as one enjoying considerable success and as one 
to be deployed in the pursuit of “standard-setting” (FSA, 2012-2013, pp. 25-26, 48, 53). 
It also specifically references it as a strategic response to financial crime. Whilst these 
illustrations help to scope the significance of “credible deterrence” for the Authority, they 
do little to illuminate how this philosophy actually works to achieve its objectives. The 
clearest illumination of this arguably comes from publications from the then Enforcement 
Division, during Margaret Cole’s time at its helm, on account that   it was Ms Cole who 
“led the FSAs drive to deliver its credible deterrence strategy” (Sants, 2012). 
 
In 2009, and shortly after its formal adoption by the FSA, the then Director of 
Enforcement explained the nature of “credible deterrence” as it has been developed as a 
key philosophy and ethos for the Authority. For Cole (2009), “credible deterrence” is all 
about: 
 
[...] delivering outcomes that make a real difference to consumers and to markets. It means 
delivering results that make people sit up and pay attention. It’s about making people 
realise that they can suffer meaningful consequences if they break the law and if they 
don’t improve their standards of behaviour. 
 
Indeed, “credible deterrence” is a key ingredient for “reforming actual behaviour”, and in 
that regard, Cole (2009) insisted its rationale of “making people frightened of the FSA” 
is a means to the end of changing behaviour “so that markets are clean, fair, and orderly 
and so that retail consumers get a fair deal”. This chimes in very strongly with current 
messages from what is now the Enforcement and Financial Crime division within the 
FSA, headed by Tracey McDermott, who as noted, insists that there are “real and 
meaningful consequences for those [...] who do not play by the rules”. And in explaining 
how the Authority actually directs this philosophy and ethos towards financial crime, 
heads of Enforcement past and present have emphasised how strongly anchored the 
pursuit of financial crime is to the Regulator’s statutory objectives. As suggested, 
historically “misconduct in, or misuse of information relating to, a financial market” was 
part of the “reduction of financial crime” objective set out in s. 2(2) of the FSMA 2000, 
as provided in s. 6(3), alongside offences (in contravention of UK law) of fraud or 
dishonesty, or handling the proceeds of crime. 
 
This is the regime under which the FSA operated for much of its existence from inception, 
and this particular aspect of FSA function was left unchanged by the Financial Services 
Act 2010 (FSA Announcement, 2010). In turn focusing on the FSMA 2000 framework 
enables this paper to focus solely on “market misconduct” within the wider legal scope 
of financial crime. The article thus confines its interest in investigating the hypothesis of 
the “haphazard pursuit” of financial crime to the FSA’s pursuit of market misconduct, 
through the significance attached to criminal enforcement of it by the philosophy of 
“credible deterrence”. The challenges presented by financial market misconduct, 
commonly conceptualised as “market abuse” for achieving financial markets which are 
clean and transparent, are widely documented throughout FSA publications, such as in 
McDermott’s (2012b) recent commitment to build on recent successes in protecting the 
integrity of financial markets using criminal and non-criminal enforcement where 
“market participants are seeking to gain an advantage by failing to play by the rules”. 
References to the debilitating effects of “market misconduct” can also be found in 
external reflections on the regulator’s enforcement machinery, such as the publicity 
generated by the short-selling scandal affecting HBOS in March 2008 which led to calls 
for strengthening of the Authority’s criminal powers on account of then Chancellor 
Alistair Darling’s message of intolerance for the quite deliberate manipulation of financial 
markets for “personal gain and with the potential to destabilise the financial system” 
(Elliott, 2008). 
 
3. Credible deterrence and criminal enforcement post-financial crisis: explaining the 
nature and significance of “market abuse” for regulators 
  
Activities found within the rubric of “market abuse” are widely referenced in FSA 
documentation as ones which interfere with “confidence in the cleanliness of our markets” 
(Cole, 2010), and which as a matter of legal definition amount to “market manipulation” 
and “insider dealing”. These individual terms can be found explained along with their 
connection with the term “market abuse” accordingly as: 
 
Insider dealing consists of a person trading in financial instruments when in possession 
of price-sensitive inside information in relation to those instruments. Market 
manipulation occurs when a person artificially manipulates the prices of financial 
instruments through practices such as the spreading of false information or rumours and 
conducting trades in related instruments. Together these practices are known as market 
abuse (European Justice Ministers, European Commission, 2012b). 
 
The rationales underpinning the effective control of market abuse are well known, 
clustering the need to ensure the efficient allocation of capital, effective price discovery, 
and “investor egalitarianism” (Ashe and Counsell, 1993; Rider and Alexander, 2009) 
whilst the practical significance of such offences for financial crime enforcement by the 
FSA can be seen from the Authority’s publications. Specifically this is evident from the 
insistence from key post holders past and present that the regulator focuses on some 
activities readily brought within the rubric of financial crime but not all. As Sants (2009) 
stressed, the Authority was not a mainstream prosecutor of financial crime, and instead it 
sought to concentrate its focus on “market-related offences and issues relating to other 
unauthorised activities such as boiler rooms”[13]. More recent publications from the 
Enforcement and Financial Crime division are also stressing mortgage fraud and bribery, 
but nevertheless, as Sants (2009) insisted, the Authority was not a central part of the 
“financial crime and fraud enforcement architecture in the UK”. This is because its 
interest in financial crime has always arisen from its statutory mandate, meaning it was 
not going to be an agency responsible for “prosecuting financial fraud in its conventional 
sense” (Sants, 2009). 
 
In stressing that the Authority’s function lies in “policing the wholesale as well as the 
retail markets [...] [and to] [...] take action where misconduct threatens confidence in them 
or undermines their integrity” (McDermott, 2012b), Tracey McDermott’s recent remarks 
echo closely those of Hector Sants. And both help to distinguish the FSA (and the 
incoming FCA) from other prosecutors of financial crime, centrally the Serious Fraud 
Office, the Central Fraud Division of the Crown Prosecution Service, and the Serious and 
Organised Crime Agency (Widlake, 1995). In relation to what the FSA actually does, and 
in the course of identifying continuities between FSA and FCA approaches, McDermott 
(2012a) has insisted the new agency would, in common with the FSA, be following a 
three-pronged attack on financial crime: “to keep crooks out of finance; to encourage 
industry to strengthen its defences; and to educate and warn customers about the danger 
they might face”. In this regard she insisted that the focus of energies would be protecting 
consumers as potential victims and preventing firms being used as locations for financial 
crimes, whilst leaving it to firms to guard against being victims of financial crimes 
themselves. The import of the Authority’s statutory objectives is always clear, whether 
or not this is actually expressed. Thus, the Authority’s concern with mortgage fraud 
alongside share fraud is very much about protecting consumers, whilst the Authority’s 
interest in bribery is not difficult to locate in its strategy of ensuring the firms are aware 
of the scope of criminal activity and are   thus informed about how to protect their business 
transactions, and their environs more generally, from becoming locations for financial 
crime. 
 The documentation dating from the FSA’s inception leaves no doubt that the regime for 
responding to the “market related offences” (Sants, 2009) of market manipulation and 
insider dealing forms a central plank in the Authority’s regulatory architecture for 
ensuring the safety and integrity of the UK financial system, with more recent 
publications stressing how this will be continued by the FCA. At the heart of FSA activity 
lay a number of offences located within the FSMA 2000 and beyond it in Part V of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1993, where in the latter case, s. 402 of the FSMA 2000 empowered 
the regulator to act as a criminal prosecutor. Offences actually located within the FSMA 
2000 spanned both criminal liability for market abuse under s. 397, and non-criminal 
offences of market manipulation and insider dealing located within s. 118 as amended by 
the implementation of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) 2003 into domestic law by the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Market Abuse) Regulations 2005. 
 
The introduction of the “new” civil/administrative pathway within s. 118 in 2000 marked 
a very different emphasis for financial market regulation in Britain, with traditional 
approaches focusing on criminal enforcement, notwithstanding the difficulties associated 
with this. In this regard, “companion” criminal market abuse offences which were located 
in s. 397 of the FSMA 2000 (now themselves formally repealed by, and restated and 
extended in the 2012 legislation)[14] were re-enanctments of those under s. 47 of the 
predecessor legislation, the Financial Services Act 1985. In relation to insider dealing, 
this was criminalised in English law initially in 1980 with the current regime to be found 
in the Criminal Justice Act 1993. Whilst the 1980s was a critical point in time for 
identifying financial market misconduct as criminal conduct, the deployment of the 
criminal law in this context has a much longer history dating back to the nineteenth 
century. Interestingly, there was actually very considerable determination to direct 
criminal responses towards financial misconduct in Victorian Britain on account of 
awareness that the business of the city was not necessarily “built on the strictest standards 
of personal morality” (Lobban, 1996, p. 327; Wilson, 2012, p. 372). But there was also 
considerable awareness of the difficulties associated with criminal enforcement which are 
readily identifiable today, including the sentiment against making “things crimes which 
are not crimes in themselves”, as expressed by Sir George Jessel MR in 1877 (Wilson, 
2012, p. 342)[15]. More recently, longstanding concerns about the criminal pathway can 
be found experienced and expressed by prosecutors, policymakers and academic 
commentators alike, where anxieties about efficacy and even appropriateness have 
become forged into a consensus that: 
 
No jurisdiction has had a great deal of success in utilising the criminal law in 
combating sophisticated abusive activity on its capital markets. The standards 
and procedures of the traditional criminal justice system, which are necessary to 
ensure general civil and human liberties, present almost insurmountable barriers 
to the effective prosecution of economic crime. While some systems have 
managed to achieve a degree of success, this has often been at considerable 
expense and it remains debatable whether public confidence has in fact been 
reinforced. Indeed, there is an argument that by drawing attention to such abuses, 
unless the legal system is able to produce a spectacular result – which may have 
little to do with the relative justice of the matter, confidence will have been 
undermined (Rider, 1995, p. 13). 
 
In this regard, the policy of the MAD 2003 was centrally to enhance responses to market 
misconduct by moving away from criminal enforcement, on account of this  being 
perceived as costly and ineffectual, and providing alternatives with civil/administrative 
mechanisms. The effectiveness of the policy within the UK can be seen in the FSA’s 
enthusiasm for non-criminal enforcement of market abuse pursued during the first half of 
the decade. This was a time when then Enforcement Director Margaret Cole insisted that 
the Authority “focused its efforts on road testing the civil regime” (Cole, 2010). That 
approach would change thereafter, and explicitly so in furtherance of “credible 
deterrence”. As explained shortly, it is very significant that this change of focus occurred 
sometime prior to the financial crisis. But for present purposes, in terms of linking the 
more general and inherent hazards of financial market activity with concerns about 
activities during the financial crisis and in its aftermath, and also suggestion that “the 
financial crisis has been something of a turning point in the regulatory response to 
financial crime around the world” (Tomasic, 2011, at 7), two extremely important 
developments have occurred at European level. 
 
The shape of things to come: European developments and domestic change 
 
For any study of the legal architecture of responses to market abuse, proposals for a 
“Regulation on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation” and “Directive on Criminal 
Sanctions for Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation” published in European 
Commission (2011d) are signature developments. For this analysis they are a key 
reference point for reflecting on the value of criminal enforcement for the pursuit of 
“credible deterrence” and in turn for considering how likely it is that the pursuit of 
financial crime post-crisis will be less “haphazard”. In a press release for the proposed 
Regulation from the European Commission (2011b) entitled “Getting tough on insider 
dealing and market manipulation”, Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, 
Michael Barnier insisted that “Market abuse is not a victimless offence. By distorting 
market prices, insider dealing and market manipulation undermine investor confidence 
and market integrity” (European Commission, 2011b). In this regard, and in response to 
such concerns, the press release embodies the European Commission’s determination to 
extend the European legislative framework and also toughen the powers and sanctions 
available to regulators. This press release explained that the legislative regime is set to 
extend to new trading platforms, and also reinforce regulators’ investigative powers 
(relating to the discovery of suspicious activity, and the protection of whistleblowers); 
facilitate tougher administrative sanctions, and even to create a (civil) offence of 
“attempted market manipulation”[16]. In the parallel development of adopting proposals 
for a “Directive on Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse” the European Commission is 
signalling clearly that financial markets need to be “more sound and transparent” 
(European Commission, 2011a), and this requires Member States to “impose criminal 
sanctions for inciting, aiding and abetting market abuse, as well as for attempts to commit 
such offences”, alongside offences of actual insider dealing and market abuse (European 
Commission, 2011a). Here the Directive itself, and references made to it by the 
Regulation and the surrounding policy discourses, are not merely signalling strengthening 
and reinforcement of the regime under the MAD 2003. What is being advocated is 
actually a very significant change in orientation of responses to market abuse. 
 
This message on the importance of strengthening the market abuse regime and   doing so 
using criminal enforcement has intensified still further in the wake of the Libor exposures 
from June 2012, resulting in amendments being made both to the Regulation and also the 
Directive proposed initially in 2011. This is so on account of the Commission’s concern 
that whilst a regulator is likely to experience difficulties in showing a causal relationship 
between the manipulation of “benchmarks” such as Libor (and Euribor), “any actual or 
attempted manipulations can [...] have a serious impact on market confidence and could 
result in significant losses to investors or distort the real economy” (European 
Commission, 2012a). In remarking that the proposed changes introduced in 2011 did not 
expressly cover such financial market “benchmarks”, the policy documentation insisted 
it was vital to ensure that a stringent legal framework exists for competent authorities to 
respond to such misconduct. The European Commission accepted that administrative 
sanctions could assist competent authorities in taking all steps necessary to prevent such 
behaviour and to direct responses to it, but it was equally resolute that the manipulation 
of benchmarks must be subject to criminal sanctions in order to “ensure the effective 
enforcement of EU policy on market integrity” (European Commission, 2012a). 
 
Proposals emerging as a result of this in July 2012 have added to amendments originally 
proposed in 2011 the prohibition of a natural or legal person from “transmitting false or 
misleading information, providing false or misleading inputs, or any action which 
manipulated the calculation of a benchmark including the manipulation of benchmarks’ 
ideologies” (European Commission, 2012a). As far as the substance of the initiative itself 
is concerned, the publicity for the amendments confirms that “benchmarks” used to price 
financial instruments will fall subject to the proposed new legislation governing market 
abuse. In turn, a benchmark is identified as “any commercial index or published figure 
calculated by the application of a formula to the value of one or more underlying assets 
or prices”, with “underlying assets or prices”, including ones relating to equities (such as 
the FTSE 100 index) bonds and commodities as well as interest rates such as Libor 
underpinning the scandal that precipitated the amendments (European Commission, 
2012a). 
 
Credible deterrence – domestic pioneering and influence beyond UK enforcement? 
 
In publicising the 2012 amendments the European Commission insisted that the 
“regulatory steps” should include “criminal sanctions” (European Commission, 2012a). 
But prior to, this initial proposals for the Directive set out in 2011, requiring Member 
States to introduce inchoate offences carrying criminal liability, pointed to these 
proposals as a reflection of a wider initiative of moving “Towards an EU criminal policy 
– Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law” (European 
Commission, 2011a). In a press release on 7 December 2012 Europe’s Justice Ministers 
announced agreement of the Commission’s proposals on criminal sanctions (European 
Commission, 2012b). In illuminating the essence of criminalising the manipulation of 
benchmarks in order to prevent significant losses to customers and investors and 
distortion of the real economy as part of a package of offences relating to “market abuse”, 
the Justice Ministers did not demure from the initial insistence that Member States must 
ensure criminal sanctions imposed in respect of them are “effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive” (European Commission, 2011a). 
 
As the new legislation’s journey towards adoption unfolds, it is clear that even prior to 
the Libor amendments the proposals from 2011 were not simply signalling an  extension 
and strengthening of European policy, but actually seeking to achieve this in a particular 
way. As far as domestic law is concerned, these particular initiatives are likely to become 
a key reference point for the current regulatory debate concerning “more Europe or less” 
(Turner, 2012)[17], as the crisis within the Eurozone shows little sign of subsiding, even 
if it is not continuing to intensify at the pace experienced during 2011 and 2012. Indeed, 
in respect of benchmarks, the new offence of making misleading statements relating to 
benchmarks under s. 91 Financial Services Act 2012 obviously has been shaped by 
domestic influences such as the Libor “scandal” itself and the Wheatley Review 
commissioned in its wake, and not obviously so by the European developments[18]. But 
in examining these proposals at face value, they are entirely consistent with European 
rhetoric on the essence of a stringent regime for responding to market abuse. The 
December 2012 press release unsurprisingly alludes to the Justice Ministers’ confidence 
that the proposals will be adopted swiftly in order to demonstrate the serious commitment 
behind “fighting market abuse and [...] protecting the integrity of our markets in the 
interests of our citizens” (European Commission, 2012b). But in its core message, that 
criminal sanctions lie at the heart of reinforcing that market abuse is not a “victimless 
offence”, and represent a “strong signal” that it will not be tolerated, the current proposals 
contrast sharply with the MAD 2003. Indeed, acknowledgement by the MAD 2003 (by 
virtue of Article 14) of a Member State’s right to impose criminal sanctions provided a 
somewhat grudging preamble to the requirement for administrative sanctions. This was 
Pan European level recognition of the perceived shortcomings of using criminal 
responses in cases of market misconduct. Such perceptions have long subsisted in the UK, 
embodied in concerns that crime widely-perceived as “victimless” becomes 
“convictionless” crime (Ashe and Counsell, 1993, p. 91). 
 
It is through this emphasis on criminal sanctions that these current initiatives mark a 
significant departure from the methodology and approach of the MAD 2003. In exploring 
this, it is extremely noteworthy that in reiterating this current migration towards criminal 
enforcement identified in 2011, the 2012 amendments actually express the importance of 
criminal enforcement for a stringent legal framework in order to achieve (with emphasis 
added) a “credible deterrent” to such behaviour (European Commission, 2012a). This is 
extremely noteworthy because rhetorically it aligns the EU position on criminal 
enforcement with that of the UK Authority. And it is the case that the FSA does regard 
criminal enforcement as a centrepiece of its enforcement machinery for responding to 
financial market misconduct. However, this regard for criminal enforcement was manifest 
at the time that “credible deterrence” became embedded into the Authority’s culture. 
Indeed, it will stressed shortly that this commitment to criminal enforcement occurred 
even prior to the formal adoption of “credible deterrence” as the Authority’s philosophy 
and ethos. And at this time, rather a different message about criminal enforcement was 
being conveyed from Brussels, courtesy of the MAD 2003’s emphasis on non-criminal 
mechanisms for enforcement. 
 
4. The end of an era? Criminal enforcement during the MAD 2003 years 
 
The proposed legislation first set out in 2011 which is now journeying towards adoption 
will amount to quite a significant shift in emphasis at European level from the MAD 2003, 
embodying changing perceptions of the value of criminal enforcement in the fight against 
market abuse. A decade ago the regulatory topography looked quite different. The 
“migration” of European capital markets law into UK securities law ensured these 
provisions were thus strongly grounded in European ideas of market confidence and 
integrity and consumer protection, pursued through informed decision-making. This 
provided the basis for the non-criminal market misconduct offences within the FSMA 
2000 regime, facilitating enforcement that is civil/administrative in orientation and 
accompanied by financial penalty, believed by many to be the most effective and 
appropriate response for market misconduct (Ashe and Counsell, 1993). This represented 
a very significant departure from the UK’s cultural preference for applying criminal law 
in this regard, and heralded an opportunity to redeem such activities from being 
“convictionless crime”. 
 
This regime was of course strengthened by the MAD 2003’s explicit inclusion of insider 
dealing within the purview of prohibited activity underpinned by non-criminal 
enforcement, but even prior to this FSA tribunal jurisprudence and policy writings 
emerging from these earliest years show the Authority’s significant enthusiasm for the 
non-criminal mechanisms. However, it is also clear that even by the time the MAD 2003 
was implemented in 2005 that the FSA was regarding criminal enforcement as a very 
significant element of its enforcement machinery, and in August of that year publicity for 
the conviction of Rigby, Bailey and Rowley under s. 397 documented this as its “first 
criminal market abuse case” (FSA Press Notice, 2005). Although the FSA has repeatedly 
stressed that “Market abuse is difficult to detect, investigate and prosecute” (FSA, 2008b), 
by 2007 the Authority had started to focus on using its powers to prosecute market abuse 
and insider dealing as criminal offences. 
 
This change in emphasis occurred at a time when the Authority was demonstrating a 
pattern of very effective and successful use of the “new” civil enforcement pathway 
provided for the first time by the FSMA 2000. And this “shift in [...] strategy” was as 
calculated as it was notable (Cole, 2010). Indeed, as Cole (2010) reflected, 
notwithstanding that the rationale for non-criminal enforcement was significantly 
underpinned by the “notoriously difficult” experiences of criminal enforcement, seeking 
prosecutions was a “conscious decision” taken in order to “demonstrate the strength of 
our commitment to credible deterrence”. This reflection also acknowledged that the 
Authority appreciated this would be a costly endeavour, both in terms of pecuniary cost 
and human resource investment, tying in this regulator’s perspective with academic 
debate on the “symbolic as well as pragmatic” nature of enforcement (Levi, 1999, p. 160), 
both in terms of the regulated community and of the wider perceived legitimacy of the 
regulator itself. And during 2008 whilst actually in post as Enforcement Director, Ms 
Cole confirmed the Authority’s “firm commitment” to bringing criminal actions to 
“support our objective of achieving clean and orderly markets through credible 
deterrence”, and also that FSA (2008a) staffing with criminal expertise was increased by 
150 per cent. 
 
5. A future with more criminal enforcement (whether this is with “more 
Europe” or “less Europe”) 
 
The EU proposals relating to market abuse from 2011, as amended in 2012, have a clear 
rationale in strengthening harmonisation of capital markets law across Member States, in 
this particular respect through the toughening of sanctions applicable to market abuse. In 
this regard, the initial publicity from the European Commission from 2011 stresses the 
importance of Europe-wide adaptation to a new “market reality”, as well as the risk to the 
real economy from a market enforcement regime which is not  sufficiently stringent in 
the light of such market realities. From this, and certainly from the 2012 amendments 
arising from Libor manipulation, the rootings of the new approaches in the financial crisis 
are much in evidence. This is entirely consistent with Tomasic’s suggestion that the crisis 
is likely to represent a turning point in the pursuit of financial crime. 
 
This general hypothesis of the crisis as a turning point for heightened focus on 
enforcement of financial crime can be found elsewhere in the UK. It can be seen for 
example manifested in the determination of new SFO Director Green (2012) QC to ensure 
that his organisation operates at the “top of its game” and is recognised as the UK’s 
leading prosecutor for serious economic crime. It is also likely that the market abuse-
fighting activities of the FSA were never an intended target of the Law Commission’s 
(2010, para. 1.1) work on promoting the “introduction of rationality and principle into the 
structure of the criminal law, especially when it is employed against business enterprises” 
embodied in its Consultation Paper on Criminal Liability in Criminal Contexts. This 
instruction given to the Law Commission in 2009 was itself a reflection of concern that 
criminal law has been too quickly resorted to by parliament and regulators, leading to the 
inappropriate criminalisation of conduct (Law Commission, 2010, the general import of 
para. A7). The Consultation Paper recommended retreat away from the use of criminal 
enforcement of “relatively minor regulatory breaches” by government departments (Law 
Commission, 2010, para. D.15), and following a period of consultation, key 
recommendations were implemented in Criminal Offences Gateway Guidance published 
by Ministry of Justice (2011). 
 
The FSA’s enforcement activities were referenced by Law Commission (2010, para. A.39) 
Consultation Paper in order to highlight generally the benefits of greater use of 
administrative sanctions. It was noted that such an approach would allow “criminal 
prosecutions and court time to be reserved for the most serious offences”. This reflected 
the philosophical position that: 
 
[...] criminal law should be employed only when engagement in the prohibited conduct in 
question warrants official censure, because it involves a harm-related moral failing, not 
just a breach of a rule or simple departure from a standard (Law Commission, 2010, para. 
4.6). 
 
This informed the central recommendation that the legitimate creation of criminal 
offences to support a regulatory strategy should be underpinned by the longstanding 
argument that “criminal offences should be created to deter and punish only serious forms 
of wrongdoing”. The Law Commission (2010, para. 1.14) illuminated “serious 
wrongdoing” as that which “involves principally deliberate, knowing, reckless or 
dishonest wrongdoing”. 
 
The Consultation Paper did consider the FSA’s administrative regime, including that 
relating to market abuse, in its discussion of the advantages and disadvantages associated 
with non-criminal enforcement pathways, and what is required to make such effective 
(Law Commission, 2010, paras A20-A30). But there is no indication of criticism for the 
FSA’s pursuit of criminal enforcement alongside this, or in the light of research 
suggesting that “it is not optimal to rely on criminal conviction as being the principal [...] 
route for the enforcement of regulatory provisions”; and indeed it was maintained that 
“[...] criminal law can have a valuable role to play in a regulatory regime” (Law 
Commission, 2010, para. A22). However, there was no allusion to Law Commission   
awareness that, as recently confirmed by the FSA’s Head of Wholesale Enforcement 
Jamie Syminton, there had been a fall in the number of civil actions for market abuse 
brought since 2010, with this being causally connected to an increase in the Authority’s 
pursuit of the “criminal route” (Syminton, 2012). There will be FCA pursuits – such as 
reporting requirements and compliance monitoring, etc. – which could be deemed to 
amount to breaches “of a rule or simple departure from a standard” (Law Commission, 
2010, para. 4.6) rather than to “serious wrongdoing”, and where the FCA may in due 
course be steered towards particular modes of enforcement rather than others, but this is 
unlikely to transpire for its market abuse enforcement regime. 
 
The Consultation Paper did also reference FSA enforcement of market abuse to make a 
distinct point about how so-called “administrative regimes” might interface with criminal 
regimes and attendant liability. Concern about this can be seen in its remark that no 
“purportedly civil penalty or administrative regime is ever completely safe from 
classification in Strasbourg as a criminal offence” (Law Commission, 2010, para. 3.31). 
It was thus “unclear whether an insider dealing case dealt with through market abuse 
proceedings [...] would be validly treated as a civil case”, and this could be very: 
 
[...] damaging for a regime which seeks to treat all financial penalty regimes as 
part of a single “administrative offence” regime, because the integrity of the 
entire system may be cast into doubt by the striking down of any one set of 
penalties within its ambit (Law Commission, 2010, para. 3.31). 
 
This latter point is a very interesting one, and one which will no doubt occupy those 
interested in “overlap issues” arising in enforcement. These arise where regimes for civil 
and criminal enforcement are not “hermetically sealed”[19] from one another, for 
example, where regulators are saddled with the practical implications of civil processes 
and criminal proceedings subsisting in “sufficiently close” proximity for Article 6 
considerations to arise, as considered in Strasbourg jurisprudence such as Engel v. The 
Netherlands (No 1)[20] and Ringvold v. Norway[21], and in the context of asset recovery 
in the Supreme Court decision in Gale & another v. SOCA[22]. Such concerns are beyond 
the scope of this article, and equally it is not necessary to dwell here on what the Law 
Commission (2010, para. 4.22) might make of the regulator’s determination to increase 
criminal enforcement, given ongoing concerns about whether: 
 
[...] the nature and degree of unacceptable risk posed by conduct together point 
towards a need for the deterrent and retributive effect of a criminal sanction, as 
opposed to a civil penalty. 
 
Trajectory and timeline: embedding “credible deterrence” pursued through criminal 
enforcement in UK regulatory culture 
 
For present purposes there is no doubt that the FCA intends to continue the FSA’s 
approach in this regard, and also that this course of action has received important 
endorsement in the current EU proposals for strengthening criminal enforcement. And in 
appreciating the significance of FSA pursuit of criminal enforcement in the pursuit of 
“credible deterrence” it is the case that this predates the EU “about face” by some 
considerable time. This FSA (2008a) trajectory is documented formally in the 
Consultation Paper Decision Procedure and Penalties Manual and Enforcement Guide 
Review 2008 and FSA Code of Market Conduct (MAR 1) (2012), as well as in the 
numerous FSA speeches discussed. Furthermore, several speeches from Margaret Cole’s 
Enforcement Division show how FSA commitment to criminal enforcement predated 
even the financial crisis. Indeed, in the earliest days of the crisis Cole (2007a)  remarked 
that although the FSA benefitted from a wide range of “rule making, investigative and 
enforcement powers” that in practice pursuing cases administratively through its 
specialist Tribunal had “[...] not proved significantly less onerous than seeking to 
prosecute” (Cole, 2007b). These speeches also alluded to the reduced deterrent value of 
non-criminal approaches some considerable time before the European Commission 
(2011b) reflected that “the sanctions currently available to regulators often lack a 
deterrent effect”. 
 
The FSA is very mindful of the complexities of conducting investigations and framing 
prosecutions around the resourcefulness of offenders to conceal their behaviour; the 
difficulties of “jury presentation”; and manageability as far as costs and court time are 
concerned, which it cites as factors informing its commitment to make full use of its 
regulatory as well as criminal powers (Cole, 2010). Indeed, in January 2013 the FSA was 
keen to publicise that its decision to fine Canadian based Swift Trade £8M had been 
upheld on appeal to the Upper Tribunal, which had described the firm’s activity as “as 
serious a case of market abuse [...] that might be imagined” (FSA Press Notice, 2013). 
However, Cole (2010) pointed to Court of Appeal dismissal of Christopher McQuiod’s 
appeal against sentence (following his conviction for insider dealing in 2009) as important 
endorsement of the superiority of criminal enforcement for “cheating” of this nature. And 
several current post holders are keen to stress that a number of successful criminal 
convictions were secured during 2011 and 2012 (FSA Press Notices, 2012a, b). For this 
analysis, it is very significant that Cole(2010)insisted that the Authority had established 
a “strong track record as a heavyweight criminal prosecutor”. It is thus apparent that 
criminal enforcement was not only deeply embedded in FSA consciousness at that time, 
butthiscommitmenttoitsuseinpreferencetothecivilpathwaycanbetracedbackseveral years. 
This occurred during the heyday of the MAD 2003’s penchant for non-criminal 
mechanisms, and was thus was firmly in place prior to the financial crisis. 
 
In making these observations, this paper does not dissent from the view that the financial 
crisis will most likely be a turning point for the enforcement of financial crime. It agrees 
entirely with Tomasic in this regard, and concurs fully with him that, for the reasons 
identified by him enforcement of financial crime is likely to be more extensive and more 
systematic than at any time prior to this, and thereby likely to become less “haphazard”. 
But it is stressed equally that FSA responses to market abuse show that the Authority was 
committed to a rather extended pursuit of financial crime using criminal enforcement 
prior to the financial crisis. This was a time where policy ideology – both domestic and 
beyond – was more ambivalent towards criminal enforcement, and political attitudes 
towards white collar crime although evident were less manifest. In one respect, the Fraud 
Act 2006 and a number of infrastructural developments supporting the “fight against 
fraud” (Kirk and Woodcock, 1996, p. 4) – such as the National Fraud Authority – date 
from this pre-crisis era, and testify to there being considerable political support for 
responding to socially injurious activities which lacked “the immediate moral outrage of 
a violent crime against a person” (Cole, 2007b)[23]. However, as Tomasic has noted 
correctly, this was also the time of high political preference for light-touch regulation and 
considerable cross-party support for ensuring the UK would be regarded as a “business 
friendly” financial centre on the world stage (Tomasic, 2011, p. 8) 
 
6. Conclusion 
  
In this context it is submitted that the FSA’s pursuit of financial crime – as demonstrated 
through its pursuit of market abuse – throughout its existence has been determined and 
actually extensive. But its very specific remit, grounded in the proper functioning and 
integrity of the UK financial system, ensured it was never destined to become the UK’s 
foremost prosecutor for serious economic crime. Beyond this, its activities have operated 
in a setting of external structural haphazardness, with this latter state of affairs arising 
from political pressures demanding effectiveness but also discouraging regulators from 
being “heavy [handed] and intrusive”. Tomasic also correctly alludes to the long-standing 
political and wider societal “ambivalence” concerning the harmful nature of white collar 
crime (Aubert, 1952, p. 266). Notwithstanding that the FSA has insisted (and specifically 
so in relation to responding to market abuse) that its risk-based approach to enforcement 
has always been “proportionate and sensible”, and dismissed suggestion that its activities 
amounted to “light touch” regulation (Cole, 2007b), such factors have informed the 
popular misconceptions of “under enforcement” behind Hector Sants’ insistence that the 
FSA was not a “mainstream prosecutor” of financial fraud. 
 
The Authority’s awareness of the (mis)conceptions alluded to by its CEO is also evident 
from its pronouncements of its “achievements” relating to financial crime, ubiquitously 
through its speeches throughout its life. This also comes through strongly from the FSA’s 
emphasis on the significance of media as an educative tool for heightening perceptions of 
financial crime, when it also frequently references media perceptions of its inaction in 
this regard (Sants’, 2009; Cole’s, 2010). That popular misconceptions about financial 
crimes themselves and their enforcement clearly concern regulators greatly is evident 
from McDermott’s (2012a) remark that that within the broad sweep of financial crime, 
tackling market abuse “is not just about money – it is about the impact that crime has on 
the lives of ordinary people [...]”, and from Syminton’s (2012) insistence that the financial 
crisis had been responsible for publicising widely that “standards of conduct and 
behaviour in the world of financial services can affect all of us” in his presentation on 
financial market abuse. 
 
The EU is currently taking up the mantle of strengthening the market abuse regime, and 
the FCA has repeatedly voiced its commitment to continuing the hard-line enforcement 
approach of the FSA. This is at the same time as signalling important new directions in 
its organisational culture. The FCA has set out its stall for being more “forward looking, 
and judgement led [...] more proactive, more direct, and be more prepared to intervene 
and intervene earlier” (Syminton, 2012), in its pursuit as a conduct regulator “focused on 
improving behaviour and raising standards to protect the integrity of markets [...] and to 
ensure consumers get a fair deal” (McDermott, 2012a). It will be interesting to see how 
this perceived culture change for the FCA is analysed as the new body beds into its 
challenging role. More immediately, as it starts to work through the implications of 
fighting all financial crime within its remit post-crisis, and not only market abuse, the 
experiences of its predecessor suggest this new body will also actively be fighting 
criticism for allowing too many occurrences of unlawful conduct to remain unprosecuted, 
and even undiscovered (Barnes, 2011, p. 189). If the FCA continues to seek to develop a 
robust and transparent, as opposed to haphazard, approach to enforcing breaches of the 
market abuse regime, surely it should receive our considerable support. 
 
Notes 
1. The determination of regulators to ensure this, and also acknowledgment of 
scepticism relating to it can be seen in Haldane’s (2012) speech delivered at Friends’ 
House, London, 26 October. 
2. And indeed G-SIFIs – or globally active, systemically important, financial 
institutions: see Financial Stability Board (2011). 
3. This includes the very highly profiled Libor fixing scandal which broke in June 
2012, and is discussed at various points herein. 
4. See also King’s (2012), “BBC Radio 4 Today Programme Lecture”. 
5. See Sants’ (2012) speech at the British Bankers’ Association briefing. The FCA 
and Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) are set to come into being in early 2013. 
6. The PRA will be part of the Bank of England and have the general objective of 
promoting the safety and soundness of regulated firms: see Bank of England “Preparing 
for the PRA”, 27 January 2012. 
7. As documented in a number of recent speeches from key FSA/FCA personnel 
such as head of Enforcement and Financial Crime Tracey McDermott and FCA Chief 
Executive Designate Martin Wheatley. 
8. Indeed, on 24 January 2013, in the context of an ongoing test case in the English 
Commercial Court brought by private parties against Barclays Bank, the High Court 
refused a request from the US Department of Justice to retain anonymity for executives 
under investigation in the USA, so as not to prejudice these criminal investigations. 
9. This is alluded to throughout the text’s discussion on the importance of 
enforcement, and also the issues which should determine the particular character of 
enforcement. 
10. See also the press release (FSA Corporate Documents, 2012) accompanying the 
publication of the 2012-2013 Business Plan which identifies “delivering market 
confidence and credible deterrence” as one of the Authority’s key focal points for its last 
year of business in its current form, prior to being split into the FCA and PRA during 
2013. 
11. See FSA documentation relating to the impact of the legislation upon the 
Authority’s regulatory objectives. 
12. See also “FSA proposes bigger fines to achieve credible deterrence”, 6 July 2009, 
especially remarks from Margaret Cole. This announcement references the proposed new 
framework applying to individuals and firms in “market abuse and non-market abuse 
cases”, with examples of the latter drawn from misconduct in the sales of financial 
products to consumers. 
13. As discussed briefly in the main text, heightening concern about mortgage fraud 
and PPI mis-selling, and also the passage of the Bribery Act 2010 have more recently 
informed the scope of the FSA’s interest in financial crime enforcement. 
14. The new offences are located in ss. 89-91. S. 89 creates a criminal offence 
relating to misleading statements which largely restates the effect of section 397(2) of 
FSMA 2000, whilst criminal liability under s. 90 relates to any act or course of conduct 
creating a false or misleading impression as to market price or value, replicating the 397(3) 
FSMA offence and also extending it through criminalising knowledge or recklessness as 
to whether a gain could be made or loss avoided through the false or misleading 
impression created. There is also a new offence relating to false or misleading impression 
relating to “benchmarks” under s. 91, which is considered further briefly in the main text. 
15.  In the Report from the Select Committee on the Companies Acts, 1862 and 1867, 
PP 1877 VIII 419 (House of Commons of Great Britain, 1877, para. 2174). 
16.  For this particular substantive development (European Commission, 2011d, para. 
3.4.1.4). 
17. See also responses from a number of key post-holders including Lord Turner to 
the question asked by Oliver Lodge during the FSA’s Annual Public Meeting 2011. 
18. See the Written Ministerial Statement on The Wheatley Review of LIBOR 
(Wheatley, 2012b) from Financial Secretary to the Treasury Greg Clark MP, 17 October 
2012. 
19. Gale & another v. Serious Organised Crime Agency [2011] UKSC 49; per Lord 
Dyson, at para. 121. 
20. (1976) 1 EHRR 647. 
21. Case 34964/97 (2003) ECHR 77. 
22. See also the reflections on Gale in SOCA v. Hymans & Ors [2011] EWHC 3332 
(QB) [2012] LLR FC (3), 199 (Wilson, 2012). 
23. Whilst insider dealing provides a specific focus for some speeches, all stress the 
serious nature of all types of market abuse as a rationale for strong criminal enforcement. 
 
References 
 
Ashe, T.M. and Counsell, L. (1993), Insider Trading, Tolley & Sons, London. 
Aubert, V. (1952), “White-collar crime and social structure”, American Journal of 
Sociology, Vol. 58, pp. 263-271. 
Barnes, P. (2011), “Insider dealing and market abuse: the UK’s record on enforcement”, 
International Journal of Law, Crime, and Justice, Vol. 39, pp. 174-189. 
Brown, G. (2010), Beyond the Crash: Overcoming the First Crisis of Globalisation, 
Simon & Schuster, London. 
Cole, M. (2007a), “Insider dealing in the city”, London School of Economics Speech, 17 
March, available at: 
www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2007/0317_mc.shtml (accessed 7 
February 2013). 
Cole, M. (2007b), “The FSA’s approach to insider dealing”, American Bar Association 
Speech, 4 October, available at: 
www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2007/1004_mc.shtml (accessed 7 
February 2013). 
Cole, M. (2008), “How enforcement makes a difference”, FSA Enforcement Law 
Conference Speech, 18 June, available at: 
www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2008/ 0618_mc.shtml (accessed 7 
February 2013). 
Cole, M. (2009), “Delivering credible deterrence”, FSA Annual Financial Crime 
Conference Speech, 27 April, available at: 
www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2009/0427_mc.shtml (accessed 7 
February 2013). 
Cole, M. (2010), “Introduction”, FSA Enforcement Conference Speech, 22 June, 
available at: www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2010/0622_mc.shtml 
(accessed 7 February 2013). 
Elliott, L. (2008), “New laws to prosecute city cheats – immunity from prosecution for 
those who blow whistle on market abuses”, The Guardian, 28 March, available at: 
www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/mar/28/marketturmoil.alistairdarling (accessed 7 
February 2013). 
European Commission (2011a), “European Commission seeks criminal sanctions for 
insider dealing and market manipulation to improve deterrence and market integrity”, 
IP/11/1218, 20 October, available at: www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-
1218_en.htm?locale=en (accessed 7 February 2013). 
European Commission (2011b), “Getting tough on insider dealing and market 
manipulation”, IP/11/1217, 20 October, available at: www.europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-11-1217_en. htm?locale=en (accessed 7 February 2013). 
European Commission (2011c), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), 
COM(2011) 651 final, 2011/0295 (COD), European Commission, Brussels, 20 October, 
available at: 
www.eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0651:FIN:EN:PDF 
(accessed 7 February 2013). 
European Commission (2012a), “Libor scandal: Commission proposes EU-wide action 
to fight rate-fixing”, IP/12/846, 25 July, available at: www.europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO12-595_en.htm (accessed 7 February 2013). 
European Commission (2012b), “Market abuse: Justice Ministers agree Commission 
proposals on criminal sanctions”, MEMO/12/963, 7 December, available at: 
www.europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_MEMO-12-963_en.htm?locale=en (accessed 7 
February 2013). 
Financial Stability Board (2011), “Policy measures to address systemically important 
financial institutions”, 4 November, available at: 
www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/ r_111104bb.pdf (accessed 7 February 
2013). 
Friedrichs, D.O. (2011), “The financial crisis as white collar (or economic) crime and the 
criminogenic architecture of Wall Street”, paper presented at Economic Crime and the 
State in the Twentieth Century: A German-American Comparison, German Institute of 
Historical Research, Washington, DC, April. 
Friedrichs, D.O. (2012), “Wall Street: crime never sleeps”, in Will, S., Handelman, S. and 
Brotherton, D. (Eds), How They Got Away With It: White Collar Criminals and the 
Financial Meltdown, Columbia University Press, New York, NY, pp. 3-26. 
FSA (2008a), Consultation Paper 08/10, May, available at: 
www.fsa.gov.uk/library/policy/cp/ 2008/08_10.shtml (accessed 7 February 2013). 
FSA (2008b), Market Watch, Markets Division: Newsletter on Market Conduct and 
Transaction Reporting Issues, No. 26, April, available at: 
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/newsletters/ mw_newsletter26.pdf (accessed 7 February 2013). 
FSA (2012-2013), Announcement of Business Plan 2012-13, 17 April 2012, available at: 
www.fsa. gov.uk/library/corporate/plan/bp2012 (accessed 7 February 2013). 
FSA Announcement (2010), Financial Services Act 2010, 24 April, available at: 
www.fsa.gov. uk/about/who/accountability/fsact_2010 (accessed 7 February 2013). 
FSA Code of Market Conduct (MAR 1) (2012), Handbook of Rules and Guidance 
(Business Standards), available at: www.fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/MAR/1 
(accessed 7 February 2013). 
FSA Corporate Documents (2012), Business Plan 2012-13, available at: 
www.fsa.gov.uk/static/ pubs/plan/bp2012-13.pdf (accessed 7 February 2013). 
FSA Press Notice (2005), “FSA secures convictions in first criminal market abuse case”, 
PN/091/2005, 18 August, available at: www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2005/ 
091.shtml (accessed 7 February 2013). 
FSA Press Notice (2012a), “Insider dealer ordered to pay £570,000 in confiscation”, 
FSA/PN/050/2012, 8 May, available at: 
www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2012/ 050.shtml (accessed 7 February 2013). 
FSA Press Notice (2012b), “Three sentenced for insider dealing”, FSA/PN/067/2012, 20 
June,   available at: www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2012/067.shtml (accessed 
7 February 2013). 
FSA Press Notice (2013), “Tribunal upholds FSA decision to fine firm £8m for market 
abuse”, FSA/PN/009/2013, 28 January, available at: 
www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/ 2013/009.shtml (accessed 7 February 2013). 
Green, D. (2012), 10th Annual Corporate Accountability Conference Speech, 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers, London, 14 June. 
Haldane, A. (2012), “A leaf being turned: occupy economics, ‘socially useful banking’”, 
Friends’ House, London, 26 October, available at: 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2012/speech616.pdf 
(accessed 7 February 2013). 
House of Commons of Great Britain (1877), Report from the Select Committee on the 
Companies Acts, 1862 and 1867, PP 1877 VIII 419. 
Inman, P. (2010), “Auditors face inquiry call after Lehman revelations”, The 
Guardian/Observer, 14 March, available at: 
www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/mar/14/reform-demandsauditors-lehman-brothers 
(accessed 7 February 2013). 
King, M. (2012), “BBC Radio 4 Today Programme Lecture”, 2 May, available at: 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_9718000/9718062.stm (accessed 7 
February 2013). 
Kirk, D. and Woodcock, A. (1996), Serious Fraud: Investigation and Trial, Butterworth, 
London. 
Law Commission (2010), Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts, LCCP 195, The 
Stationary Office, London, available at: 
www.lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/criminal-liabilityin-regulatory-contexts.htm 
(accessed 7 February 2013). 
Levi, M. (1999), “Regulating fraud revisited”, in Davies, P., Francis, P. and Jupp, V. (Eds), 
Invisible Crimes: Their Victims and Their Regulation, Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 143-
167. 
McDermott, T. (2012a), “Combating financial crime: key themes and priorities for 2013”, 
APCIMS Conference Speech, 15 November, available at: 
www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2012/1115-tm.shtml (accessed 7 
February 2013). 
McDermott, T. (2012b), “Credible deterrence: here to stay”, FSA’s Enforcement 
Conference Speech, 2 July, available at: 
www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2012/0702tm.shtml (accessed 7 
February 2013). 
Ministry of Justice (2011), Criminal Offences Gateway Guidance, August, available at: 
www. justice.gov.uk/legislation/criminal-offences-gateway (accessed 7 February 2013). 
O’Brien, J. (2012), “The facade of enforcement: Goldman Sachs, negotiated prosecution, 
and the politics of blame”, in Will, S., Handelman, S. and Brotherton, D. (Eds), How They 
Got Away With It: White Collar Criminals and the Financial Meltdown, Columbia 
University Press, New York, NY, pp. 178-202. 
Omoyele, O. (2006), “Accountability of the FSA”, Company Lawyer, Vol. 27 No. 7, pp. 
194-203. 
Rider, B. (1995), “Civilising the law – the use of civil proceedings to enforce financial 
services law in the United Kingdom”, Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 11-
33. 
Rider, B. and Alexander, K. (2009), Market Abuse and Insider Dealing, Tottel, Haywards 
Heath. 
Sants, H. (2009), “Delivering intensive supervision and credible deterrence”, Reuters 
Newsmakers Event Speech, 12 March, available at: 
www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2009/0312_hs.shtml (accessed 7 
February 2013). 
Sants, H. (2012), “Delivering ‘twin peaks’ within the FSA”, Speech at the British Bankers’ 
Association Briefing, London, 6 February, available at: www.fsa.gov.uk/library/ 
communication/speeches/2012/0206-hs.shtml (accessed 7 February 2013). 
Sutherland, E.H. (1940), “White collar criminality”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 
5, pp. 1-12.  
Sutherland, E.H. (1945), “Is ‘white collar crime’ crime?”, American Sociological Review, 
Vol. 10,  pp. 132-139. 
Sutherland, E.H. (1949), White Collar Crime, Dryden Press, New York, NY. 
Syminton, J. (2012), “Challenging the culture of market behaviour”, City and Financial 
Market Abuse Conference Speech, London, 4 December, available at: 
www.fsa.gov.uk/library/ communication/speeches/2012/1204-js (accessed 7 February 
2013). 
Thomas, L. Jr (2008), “Former Bear Stearns executives to face criminal charges in 
hedge fund collapse”, The New York Times, 19 June, available at: www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/06/19/business/worldbusiness/19iht-19bear.13827527.html?_r=2& (accessed 7 
February 2013). 
Tomasic, R. (2011), “The financial crisis and the haphazard pursuit of financial crime”, 
Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 18 No. 1, pp. 7-33. 
Turner, A. (2012), “Financial risk and regulation: do we need more Europe or less?”, FSA 
Chairman, Central Bank of Ireland Conference on ‘Financial Regulation: The Response 
to the Crisis’ Speech, 27 April, available at: www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/ 
speeches/2012/0427-at.shtml (accessed 7 February 2013). 
Wheatley, M. (2012a), “The FCA: the future of conduct regulation”, BBA Annual 
Banking Conference, 17 October, available at: 
www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2012/1017-mw.shtml (accessed 7 
February 2013). 
Wheatley, M. (2012b), The Wheatley Review of LIBOR – Final Report, HM Treasury, 
London, 28 September, available at: 
www.cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/wheatley_review_libor_ finalreport_280912.pdf (accessed 
7 February 2013). 
Widlake, B. (1995), Serious Fraud Office, Little, Brown and Co., London. 
Wilson, S. (2012), SOCA v. Hymans & Ors [2011] EWHC 3332 (QB) [2012] LLR FC 
(3), 199. 
 
Further reading 
 
Alexander, K. and Moloney, N. (Eds) (2011), Law Reform and Financial Markets, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Avgouleas, E. (2005), The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Baldwin, R. (2004), “The new punitive regulation”, Modern Law Review, Vol. 67 No. 3, 
pp. 351-383. 
Bank of England (2012), “Preparing for the PRA”, 27 January, available at: 
www.bankofengland. co.uk/publications/Pages/other/pra/pra.aspx (accessed 7 February 
2013). 
Clark, G. (2012), Written Ministerial Statement on Wheatley Review of LIBOR, HM 
Treasury, London, 17 October, available at: 
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/wms_fst_171012.pdf (accessed 7 February 2013). 
Cole, M. (2011), “Financial Conduct Authority: a new regulatory approach”, Speech, 28 
June, available at: 
www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2011/0628_mc.shtml (accessed 7 
February 2013). 
Croall, H. (1989), “Who is the white-collar criminal?”, British Journal of Criminology, 
Vol. 29 No. 2, pp. 157-174. 
Croall, H. (2001), Understanding White Collar Crime, Open University Press, 
Buckingham. 
European Commission (2011), Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on Criminal Sanctions for Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation, 
COM(2011) 654 final 2011/0297 (COD), European Commission, Brussels, 20 October, 
available at: www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/abuse/COM_2012_420_ 
en.pdf (accessed 7 February 2013). 
European Commission (2012a), Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Criminal Sanctions for Insider Dealing and Market 
Manipulation, COM(2012) 420 final 2011/0297 (COD), European Commission, Brussels, 
25 July, available at: 
www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/abuse/COM_2012_420_en.pdf 
(accessed 7 February 2013). 
European Commission (2012b), Amended Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market 
Abuse), COM(2012) 421 final 2011/0295 (COD), European Commission, Brussels, 25 
July, available at: 
www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/abuse/COM_2012_421_en.pdf 
(accessed 7 February 2013). 
European Commission (2012c), Consultation Document on the Regulation of Indices: A 
Possible Framework for the Regulation of the Production and Use of Indices Serving as 
Benchmarks in Financial and Other Contracts, European Commission, Brussels, 5 
September, available at: www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2012/ 
benchmarks/consultation-document_en.pdf (accessed 7 February 2013). 
Friedrichs, D.O. (2010), Trusted Criminals: White Collar Crime in Contemporary Society, 
Wadsworth, Belmont, CA. 
FSA (2009), “FSA financial crime – stakeholder research”, prepared for the Financial 
Services Authority by GfK NOP, January, available at: www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/consumer-
research/ crpr58.pdf (accessed 7 February 2013). 
FSA (2011/2012), Annual Report 2011/12, Section 3: Delivering Market Confidence, 
available at: www.fsa.gov.uk/library/corporate/annual/ar11-12.shtml (accessed 7 
February 2013). 
FSA Press Notice (2009a), “FSA continues to strengthen enforcement team”, 
FSA/PN/035/2009, 9 March, available at: 
www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2009/035.shtml (accessed 7 February 2013). 
FSA Press Notice (2009b), “FSA proposes bigger fines to achieve credible deterrence”, 
FSA/PN/091/2009, 6 July, available at: www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2009/ 
091.shtml (accessed 7 February 2013). 
FSA Press Notice (2012a), “Former corporate broker at Meryll Lynch fined £350,000 for 
disclosing inside information”, FSA/PN/014/2012, 16 February, available at: 
www.fsa.gov. uk/library/communication/pr/2012/014.shtml (accessed 7 February 2013). 
FSA Press Notice (2012b), FSA Managing Director, Margaret Cole, to leave this year, 
FSA/PN013/2012, 15 February, available at: www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/ 
2012/013.shtml (accessed 7 February 2013). 
Green, G.S. (1990), Occupational Crime, Nelson Hall, Chicago, IL. 
Hannigan, B. (1994), Insider Dealing, Sweet & Maxwell, London. 
Herring, J. (2006), Criminal Law Text, Cases and Materials, Clarendon, Oxford. 
House of Commons, Treasury Committee (2008), The Run on the Rock, HC 56-1, The 
Stationery Office, London, available at: 
 www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasy/56/56i.pdf (accessed 
7 February 2013). 
House of Commons, Treasury Committee (2009), Banking Crisis: Reforming Corporate 
Governance and Pay in the City, HC 519, The Stationery Office, London. 
IMF (2001), Financial System Abuse, Financial Crime and Money Laundering – 
Background Paper, International Monetary Fund, available at: 
www.imf.org/external/np/ml/2001/eng/ 27 021201.pdf (accessed 7 February 2013).   
Karstedt, S. and Farrall, S. (2004), “The moral maze of the middle class: the predatory 
society and its emerging regulatory order”, in Albrecht, H.J., Serassis, T. and Kania, H. 
(Eds), Images of Crime II, Edition Iuscrim, Freiburg, pp. 65-94. 
Levi, M. (1987), Regulating Fraud – White-Collar Crime and the Criminal Process, 
Tavistock, London. 
Levi, M. and Burrows, J. (2008), “Measuring the impact of fraud: a conceptual and 
empirical journey”, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 48, pp. 293-318. 
Lomnicka, E.Z. (2000), “Making the FSA accountable”, Journal of Business Law, Vol. 1, 
pp. 65-81. 
McDermott, T. (2012), “An update on the FSA’s investigations and enforcement regime”, 
City and Financial Conference Speech, 23 February, available at: 
www.fsa.gov.uk/library/ communication/speeches/2012/0223-tm.shtml (accessed 7 
February 2013). 
Maloney, N. (2008), EC Securities Regulation, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Nelken, D. (1994a), White Collar Crime, Dartmouth Press, Aldershot. 
Nelken, D. (1994b), “White collar crime”, in Maguire, M., Roberts, R. and Reiner, R. 
(Eds), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 360-
392. 
Rosoff, S., Pontell, H. and Tillman, R. (2001), Profit Without Honor: White-Collar Crime 
and the Looting of America, Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ. 
Sants, H. (2010a), Annual Public Meeting (APM) Speech, 24 June, available at: 
 www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/library/communication/speeches/2010/0624_hs.shtml 
(accessed7 February 2013). 
Sants, H. (2010b), “Can culture be regulated?”, Mansion House Conference on Values 
and Trust Speech, 4 October, available at: 
www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2010/1004_hs.shtml (accessed 7 
February 2013). 
Shapiro, S. (1990), “Collaring the crime, not the criminal: reconsidering the concept of a 
white-collar crime”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 55, pp. 346-365. 
Tappan, P. (1947), “Who is the criminal”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 12, pp. 
96-102. 
Turner, A. (2009), The Turner Review – A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking 
Crisis, Financial Services Authority, London, available at: 
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_ review.pdf (accessed 7 February 2013). 
Vickers, J. (2011), Report of the Independent Commission on Banking, available at: 
www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06171.pdf (accessed 7 February 2013). 
Walker, D. (2009), A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial 
Industry Entities, HM Treasury, London, available at: 
www.webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/þ/http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/walker_re
view_261109.pdf (accessed 7 February 2013). 
Weisburd, D. and Waring, E. (2001), White-Collar Crime and Criminal Careers, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Weisburd, D., Wheeler, S., Waring, E. and Bode, N. (1991), Crimes of the Middle Classes: 
White Collar Offenders in the Federal Courts, Yale University Press, London. 
Wheeler, S., Weisburd, D. and Bode, N. (1982), “Sentencing the white collar offender: 
rhetoric and reality”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 47, pp. 641-659. 
Whitman, Q. (2005), Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide 
Between America and Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Wilson, G. and Wilson, S. (2010), “Market misconduct, the Financial Services Authority 
and   creating a system of ‘city grasses’: blowing the whistle on whistle-blowing”, 
Company Lawyer, Vol. 31 No. 3, pp. 67-81. 
Wilson, S. (2006), “Law, morality, and regulation: Victorian experiences of financial 
crime”, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 46 No. 6, pp. 1073-1090. 
